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ABSTRACT
In 2010 Spain ranked second among EU-15 countries in the manufacture
of passenger cars; however, in 1950 the country’s car production had been
purely symbolic. Taking as its starting point the trajectories of the enterprises
that have shaped the auto industry in Spain, this study explores the sector’s
process of development within the interpretative framework proposed
by Alfred D. Chandler in Scale and Scope. Until the mid-1970s, SEAT
and FASA-Renault, the sector’s ﬁrst-movers, maintained their position as
industry leaders. The entry of Ford and GM in the 1970s was to restructure
the industry as it shifted its focus towards exportation to the European
Economic Community. Both market share and net proﬁts are used as indi-
cators of the evolution of each car maker.
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RESUMEN
En 2010 España ﬁguró en el segundo puesto en producción de
automóviles de turismo entre los países de la UE-15. No obstante, en 1950 la
producción de coches era puramente testimonial. Siguiendo el marco inter-
pretativo propuesto por Alfred D. Chandler en Scale and Scope, el trabajo
explora el proceso de desarrollo de esta industria a partir de las trayectorias de
las distintas empresas. Hasta mediados de los setenta, SEAT y FASA-Renault,
deﬁnidas como ﬁrst-movers, mantuvieron su posición como líderes del sector.
La entrada de Ford y GM alteró la estructura de la industria, que se orientó
hacia la exportación a la CEE. La cuota de mercado y los beneﬁcios netos se
utilizan como indicadores de la evolución de cada fabricante.
Palabras clave: Automóvil, Industria, España, Desarrollo, Chandler
1. INTRODUCTION
Scale and Scope represents the culmination of the research conducted
by Alfred D. Chandler Jr. into the emergence and growth of large-scale
enterprise and Chandler’s work remains one of the most powerful and
thought-provoking explorations of economic and business history to appear
in the last half-century1. In this work, Chandler tests his initial hypotheses
about the determinants of success for the large-scale enterprise as an insti-
tution in the United States by undertaking a comparative analysis with Great
Britain and Germany (see Chandler 1962, 1977). On the strength of empirical
evidence obtained from the study of the 200 largest industrial ﬁrms in each
country, Chandler describes three models of capitalism articulated in terms
of large-scale enterprise: competitive managerial capitalism, characteristic of
the United States; personal capitalism, predominant in Great Britain; and
ﬁnally, cooperative capitalism, typical of Germany. Precisely because his
research is limited in time to the period between the 1880s and the mid-20th
century and focuses only on the three countries mentioned, Chandler
concludes his work with a call for further case studies to validate or refute his
thesis «industry-by-industry, country-by-country» (Chandler 1990, p. 628).
Picking up the gauntlet thrown down by Chandler, the aim of this paper is to
place the development of Spain’s car industry within Chandler’s explanatory
model of dynamic change in industrial capitalism2.
In Scale and Scope, Chandler explains that the success of the second indus-
trial revolution can be attributed to the potential to exploit the cost advantages
1 Chandler’s work still provokes great debate among leading economic historians, including
Scranton (1997), Amatori (1997), Wilkins (2008) and Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012).
2 An overview of the history of the ﬁrm in Spain can be found in Comín and Martín Aceña
(1996) and Valdaliso and López (2000).
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of the economies of scale and scope derived from the new capital-intensive
production technologies. A three-pronged investment was mandatory to
maximise these potential cost advantages: investment in production facilities —
to exploit a technology’s potential economies of scale and scope; investment
in marketing and the distribution network— to sell the increased production
volume; and investment in management and organisation — to coordinate
and monitor basic functional activities, and to plan and allocate resources for
future production and distribution. The large ﬁrms that managed to exploit the
economies of scale fully enjoyed an impressive cost advantage over the rest.
The three-pronged investments made by the ﬁrst-movers raised a high barrier
to entry for the latecomers. The pioneers were able to maintain their market
share because their net proﬁts, which permitted them a level of investment
that the challengers could not match. However, market share could only be
maintained if the managerial organisation evolved its functional capabilities
and adjusted its strategies according to constantly changing market and
technological opportunities. By building a coherent managerial structure,
companies were able to compete both functionally (developing more efﬁcient
processes of production and distribution, new and differentiated products and
better marketing services) and strategically (moving into growing markets
more rapidly and out of declining ones more quickly). Their efﬁciency was thus
revealed by their ability to maintain market share and proﬁt levels.
The proposals made in Scale and Scope obtained an immediate response.
As well as a number of important criticisms, the book gave rise to numerous
studies that adhered to the agenda proposed3. In relation to the Spanish
case, the most notable contribution was the study published by Albert
Carreras and Xavier Tafunell (1997) within the book edited by Chandler
himself, together with Franco Amatori and Takashi Hikino, which offered an
international and comparative perspective of Chandler’s ideas. The Spanish
case study provides an analysis of the evolution of the 200 largest Spanish
ﬁrms measured in terms of their assets between 1917 and 1990, employing
six benchmarks. Two of the ﬁndings presented are of signiﬁcance for the
discussion undertaken in this article. First, the period of greatest growth for
Spain’s large ﬁrms comprised the years between 1960 and 1974; and, second,
in 1974 car makers were predominant among the country’s largest manu-
facturing ﬁrms, with SEAT (sixth), Ford España (eighth), FASA-Renault
(thirteenth) and Chrysler España (fourteenth) ranked within the top ﬁfteen.
In addition, based on an aggregate analysis of Spain’s 100 largest non-
ﬁnancial corporations in terms of sales in 1973 and 2002 and in terms of
assets in 1950, Veronica Binda (2012, pp. 522-523) reports that these ﬁrms
shaped their strategies and structures based not solely on economic facts, but
also in relation to the political and social context, pointing to the importance
of such factors as delayed industrialisation and state intervention.
3 On criticism, see, for example, Supple (1991) and Hannah (1995).
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While the exploitation of large databases of different benchmarks consti-
tuted one of the pillars on which Chandler based his proposals, the other
was his extraordinary factual rigour, derived from exhaustive historical
case studies. The aim of this study is therefore to participate in the debate
on the dynamics of industrial capitalism by analysing the process of
development of the automotive industry in Spain. In his pioneering book
Concept of the Corporation, Peter Drucker (1946) deﬁned the automotive
industry as «the industry of industries» (cited in Womack et al. 1990, p. 9).
And he was not mistaken. Car manufacturing became a strategic factor of the
ﬁrst order in the promotion of industrialisation in the developing countries.
When Drucker made his assessment, the manufacture of passenger cars in
Spain was purely symbolic. The absence of one of the most characteristic
industries of the second industrial revolution complicated the industrialisa-
tion of the Iberian Peninsula. Nonetheless, by the outset of the 21st century,
turnover in the sector (including parts and components) represented roughly
5 per cent of Spanish GDP and 20 per cent of total exports. The sector’s
balance of trade was clearly positive and twelve of the thirty large-
scale exporters in Spain operated in the sector (Asociación Nacional de
Fabricantes de Automóbiles y Caminones (ANFAC), 1990-2010). These data
point to the automotive industry as one of the chief driving forces of the
Spanish economy.
Studies by Jordi Catalan (2000) and José L. García Ruiz (2001) represent
the ﬁrst academic analyses of the trajectory of the automotive industry in
Spain. Among the general factors behind the industry’s development, Catalan
(2000, pp. 136-137) points to the prominence of proactive strategic policies
(protection, limited investment licences and local content requirements),
the positive response of the Spanish manufacturing base (which reaped
beneﬁts from the presence of externalities arising out of the Marshallian
industrial districts) and the success of business initiatives such as SEAT and
FASA-Renault. Catalan (2000, pp. 145-146), taking a view that is, broadly
speaking, shared by García Ruiz (2001, p. 154) places the emphasis on the
abrupt shift in industrial policy that occurred in 1972 with the enactment of
the so-called Ford decrees. From that moment onwards, the leitmotif of
industrial policy focused on the attraction of the U.S. giants and integration
in the European Economic Community (EEC). This new direction entailed
the gradual dismantling of protectionism and the discontinuation of pre-
ferential support for the state-owned enterprise SEAT, which was plunged
into a serious crisis. With these changes, the industry’s source of growth
shifted towards exportation to the EEC4.
However, when these studies appeared, our historical understanding of
the individual development of the enterprises shaping Spain’s automotive
4 Catalan revisits these conclusions in Catalan (2010) and Catalan and Fernández-de-Sevilla
(2013).
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industry was still in a very early stage. For this reason, their publication
spurred the appearance of a number of studies addressing the main com-
panies in the sector. By applying a business historical lens to a qualitative
aggregation of these studies, we aim to further our knowledge of the pas-
senger car industry in line with both the analytical framework and
the empirical strategies deﬁned by Chandler. Adhering to his claim that
«Price remained a signiﬁcant competitive weapon, but these ﬁrms competed
more forcefully for market share and increased proﬁts by means of func-
tional and strategic efﬁciency» (Chandler 1990, p. 36), this paper uses both
the market share in Spain and net proﬁts as indicators of the evolution of
each car maker.
Section 2 starts with an examination of the main initiatives predating
the creation of SEAT and FASA, the two ﬁrms identiﬁed as ﬁrst-movers.
It then addresses the creation of these two ﬁrms and their subsequent
development. This is followed, in Section 3, by a description of business
initiatives that sought to challenge the dominant position of SEAT and
FASA during the 1960s. The penultimate section explores the consequences
of the shift in industrial policy in the 1970s, and the ﬁnal section shows
the process of sector restructuring. The study concludes with Spain’s
new membership of the EEC. By that time, the Spanish passenger car
industry was already a mature sector. Aggregate production stood at the
same level in Spain as in Italy and it had outstripped Great Britain.
In addition, the industry’s export percentage was greater than 50 per cent of
units produced.
Chandler (1992) argues that the focus on the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capabilities provides an analytical framework in which to situate studies of
the evolutionary nature of large industrial enterprises. These organisational
capabilities, derived from competitive struggle, become the basis for their
continuing growth. In analysing the evolution of existing industries, the ﬁrm
would seem to be a useful unit of analysis. Such research requires a con-
sideration of the way in which each enterprise develops its organisational
capabilities and how this is reﬂected in their long-term competitive strengths
and weaknesses. As the following sections in this article show, in the case
of the car industry in Spain, the ability to control and pull the strings of
government became one of the industry’s core competencies. Two ﬁrms that
produced their ﬁrst cars in 1953, SEAT and FASA, were to establish them-
selves as ﬁrst-movers. In the 1950s and 1960s the dominant position of these
two ﬁrms was still open to challenge. At the business level, the reconﬁgura-
tion of the sector only became possible with a change in the direction of
industrial policy in the early 1970s when a new legal framework opened
the doors to Ford and GM. The presence of these U.S. giants substantially
altered the business structure of the sector, which was pushed deﬁnitively into
the dynamics of large-scale transnational ﬁrms, participating fully in the
international division of labour that they proposed.
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2. THE TAKEOFF OF THE FIRST-MOVERS
In Spain, the ﬁrst recorded experience of automobile construction took
place in 1889, when Francesc Bonet patented a tricycle powered by the com-
bustion engine in Barcelona. During the ﬁrst third of the 20th century, some
forty initiatives in the Catalan capital and a further ten outside Catalonia
followed Bonet’s pioneering work. Of these, Hispano-Suiza, which was also
founded in Barcelona by a group of capitalists led by Damià Mateu but in 1904,
stands out. The impressive results obtained by the Swiss engineer Markus
Birkigt rapidly gained the company an excellent reputation not only on the
peninsula but also in Europe. However, the company’s potential was limited by
the orientation of its activity towards luxury models at the expense of mass
production. By the end of the 1920s, Hispano-Suiza’s modest production
ﬁgures — about 1,000 passenger cars, 500 trucks and 600 aircraft engines per
year — left the company lagging far behind the leading European ﬁrms5.
In those years, the Spanish market was dominated by Ford, while local
manufacturers had negligible market shares. From 1923, the U.S. giant had
operations in Barcelona. As a result of the depression of 1929, the U.S.
automaker transferred 40 per cent of the capital in their subsidiary to
local shareholders and the subsidiary was renamed Ford Motor Ibérica
(Estapé 1998). Finally, the victory of General Franco’s rebel forces in the
Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 cut short the company’s development.
In the early years of the Franco dictatorship, industrial policy had many
points in common with the industrial policy applied in Nazi Germany.
In the year of its victory, the insurgent government enacted a law covering
the organisation and defence of industry, taking the view that industry
was «parte integrante del Patrimonio Nacional y subordinada al interés
supremo de la Nación» and proclaiming that «no podrán instalarse nuevas
industrias, traslados ni ampliar las existentes, sin la resolución favorable del
Ministerio de Industria y Comercio» (Boletin Oﬁcial del Estado [BOE], 15
December 1939).
In the automotive sector, the inspiration taken by the new regime from
the Axis powers and the strictly discretionary nature of its decisions were
both strongly felt. Ford became the subject of blatant discrimination and
ﬁnally abandoned its subsidiary in 19536. For its part, GM’s proposal to set
up in Spain, which happened in 1939 immediately on conclusion of the
Civil War, received a swift veto (see Catalan 1995, p. 153; San Román 1999,
pp. 254-256). Shortly afterward, the regime set up the National Institute of
Industry (Instituto Nacional de Industria, or INI, in Spanish), presided over
5 In 1946 the Hispano factory in Barcelona was acquired by a state agency and it turned its
attention to truck production. The history of Hispano is described in Lage (2003) and Nadal (2010).
6 Ford sold its entire stake in its subsidiary to local shareholders and Ford Motor Ibérica
became Motor Ibérica (Estapé 1998).
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by Juan Antonio Suanzes7. The INI was a state entity, or public holding
company, fashioned after Mussolini’s Institute for Industrial Reconstruction,
and its purpose was to promote industrial development in Spain based on an
autarkic conception of the economy. Suanzes did not hesitate to intervene
directly in order to give the INI control over domestic production of motor
vehicles (see Martín Aceña and Comín 1991, pp. 225-229).
Banco Urquijo and FIAT began to negotiate the transfer of technology to
manufacture vehicles in Franco’s Spain in early 1939, but the conversations
collapsed as a result of the intrusion of Suanzes (see San Román 1995,
pp. 143-149). In 1947, Banco Urquijo and FIAT reopened negotiations and
once again Suanzes interfered. Emboldened by his appointment as minister
for industry, he forced Banco Urquijo to accept the INI’s control over the
project. Finally, between July and October 1948, agreements were forged to
enable FIAT to accept the granting of its licences in exchange for 12.5 million
pesetas, a royalty of 3 per cent on the sale price of each vehicle and a Spanish
commitment not to export.
On 9 May 1950, the Sociedad Española de Automóviles de Turismo (SEAT)
was established. SEAT received numerous tax beneﬁts as a result of its having
been recognised as an enterprise of national interest. Its nominal capital was
600 million pesetas. The INI, with 51 per cent of the capital stock, was the
majority shareholder. In addition, six Spanish banks, led by Banco Urquijo,
each held 7 per cent of the capital stock with FIAT retaining the remaining 7
per cent. The SEAT factory was built in the Zona Franca area of the Barcelona
port (see San Román 1999, pp. 236-247; Catalan 2006, pp. 144-149).
SEAT began operations in the summer of 1953 with the production of the
FIAT 1400, a mid-range model. Two years later, SEAT expanded its capital
stock to 900 million pesetas. The aim was to obtain production of the FIAT
600, a low-end model more in line with the state of the Spanish market. The
ﬁrst units of the new vehicle were manufactured in the spring of 1957. A year
later, the percentage of local parts and components incorporated in the
model’s production reached 97 per cent. Its success was immediate and
production swiftly topped 20,000 units annually, pushing SEAT beyond the
threshold for mass production (see Catalan 2006, pp. 148-153).
The company went on to experience uninterrupted growth, exceeding
50,000 cars per year in 1964 and 100,000 in 1966. In 1967, FIAT increased its
stake in the company to 36 per cent, while the INI reduced its stake to a similar
level. According to Catalan (2006, pp. 167-169), three factors can account for
FIAT’s shift: the security created by the increase in FIAT’s relative clout among
shareholders; the massive strikes and social unrest in Italy in 1969, which made
SEAT look like a good alternative to internal Italian supplies; and the
demonstrated willingness of the Spanish government to defend domestic
7 On 2 February 1938, Suanzes had been appointed minister of industry and trade in Franco’s
ﬁrst government. Suanzes was dismissed on 11 August 1939.
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production. In short, SEAT’s production capacity soared: by 1969, annual
production surpassed 200,000 cars and by 1972 it exceeded 300,000.
The other company that could be called a ﬁrst-mover was Fabricación de
Automóviles Sociedad Anónima (FASA), founded on 29 December 1951 in
Valladolid. FASA’s objective was to assemble the Renault 4CV. The driving force
behind the project was the then Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Jiménez-Alfaro, who
was ultimately named general manager and oversaw the management of the
company. In late 1950, Jiménez-Alfaro successfully concluded lengthy negotia-
tions to gain production licences for the 4CV. According to the agreement, the
French would refrain from ﬁnancial participation in the future company and
gave assurances that the units produced would be distributed by their com-
mercial subsidiary in Spain, the Sociedad Anónima Española de Automóviles
Renault (SAEAR; see Sánchez Sánchez 2006, p. 353). SAEAR had been set up in
1909 and had remained completely inactive since the outbreak of the Civil War.
Now that an agreement had been reached with the French, Jiménez-
Alfaro needed to overcome the INI’s direct opposition to achieve the
necessary administrative permission. To remove this hurdle, the Lieutenant
Colonel offered Nicolás Franco, the dictator’s brother and a former colleague
of Suanzes in the naval military school, the chairmanship of the future
company. Inﬂuence peddling— a highly regarded activity in Spain—was his
main skill8, and administrative authorisation was obtained in October 1951.
The conditions included a requirement to incorporate a percentage of
domestic content in each car that would be 90 per cent by the end of the 3rd
year and 100 per cent by the end of 6 years (BOE, 19 October 1951). The next
step was to ﬁnd the committed ﬁnance. A 100 small investors of Valladolid
contributed the initial capital of 5 million pesetas and disbursed 39 of the
55 million pesetas for the immediate expansion. The remainder was covered
by SAEAR (see Fernández-de-Sevilla 2010a, pp. 141-142).
The ﬁrst units of the 4CV were assembled in August 1953. Following high
levels of tension between the investor group in Valladolid and SAEAR, Banco
Ibérico of the Fierro family purchased 10 per cent of the capital in 1954.
A year later, Banco Santander acquired another 10 per cent of the shares. In
this way, two leading Spanish ﬁnancial institutions with strong industrial
interests gained a stake in the automotive company and they shared the same
interest in FASA: to link FASA’s development to the development of their
own industrial portfolios (see Fernández-de-Sevilla 2010a, pp. 145-150).
In mid-1955, Banco Santander became the principal shareholder of
FASA. In the wake of this shift, Nicolás Franco and Manuel Jiménez-Alfaro
agreed to step back and leave direct control of FASA in the hands of
Eduardo Ruiz de Huidobro, Banco Santander’s strong man in Valladolid. His
mandate was unambiguous: to ensure the manufacture of the engines
and gearboxes in Spain. Huidobro commissioned the engine from Nueva
8 See Garriga’s (1980) biography of Nicolás Franco.
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Montaña Quijano (NMQ), a company run by Banco Santander, while the
production of the transmission was entrusted to Industrias Subsidiarias de
Aviación, a company in the Fierro Group. Between 1958 and 1961, Banco
Santander had absolute control of FASA and FASA’s production stagnated in
the region of 8,000 cars a year. Eventually, Banco Santander sold its stake to
Banco Ibérico (see Fernández-de-Sevilla 2010a, pp. 151-153).
It was under the control of the Fierro family that FASA began mass
production. Not only did production capacity rise sharply under the company’s
new masters, but also a process to integrate production vertically was initiated.
In time, FASA took over direct manufacture of engines, gearboxes and body-
work. Banco Ibérico’s sole control of FASA came to end in 1965. At that time,
FASA’s annual production of Renault automobiles bordered on 50,000 units,
the models under production had been diversiﬁed and their rates of domestic
production stood at roughly 90 per cent. As a result, the ﬁrm had become the
primary centre of Renault automobile production outside France. However,
efforts made to achieve integrated development revealed Banco Ibérico’s lack of
ability to take the project forward under its own steam. In the course of the
second half of 1964, negotiations resulted in the takeover of SAEAR by FASA. At
the same time, Renault acquired a majority stake in FASA that was transformed
into FASA-Renault, and the Fierros became minority shareholders.
The French reorganised their new subsidiary on functional lines in order
to achieve a management structure capable of making the most of
their planned investment in production, marketing and distribution. The
emergence of large modern enterprises in France had been characterised by
their slow rate of development. The turning point in the promotion of
managerial capitalism was to be the nationalisations of 1944-1948, in which
that of Renault was the most signiﬁcant as Patrick Fridenson (1997, p. 231)
explains. According to Michel Freyssenet (1998, pp. 366-371), Renault’s
production model, based on volume and diversiﬁcation, reached its zenith in
the 1960s. As shown by Loubet (2000, pp. 140-184), at the time it acquired
FASA, Renault was already a large ﬁrm that had successfully completed the
three-pronged investment. Marketing and distribution capabilities were
crucial in a sector marked by steadily increasing supply and a demand that
had lost its impetus since the mid-1960s. The experience of Renault’s sales
department provided the basis for the strategy in Spain. As in France, this
strategy turned on the diversiﬁcation of models and the expansion of points
of sale. Range and network bore fruit. In 1972, the launch of a second
assembly plant enabled FASA-Renault’s production to top 100,000 vehicles a
year (see Fernández-de-Sevilla 2010b, pp. 480-486).
In the light of the foregoing, it seems clear that the main source of
advantage lay in SEAT’s ability to exploit its scale economies. The SEAT 600
was to play a leading role in the company’s takeoff, representing 56 per cent
of the units produced in the 1960s. By contrast, FASA-Renault’s adoption of
mass production was much slower, and was not consolidated until Renault
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eventually assumed the reins of the company. The French focused their
strategy on the diversiﬁcation and expansion of its sales network, which
ushered in good results and facilitated the construction of a second assembly
factory in 1969. Thus, both companies completed their three-pronged
investment during the decade of the 1960s. The chief difference between
the two lay in their respective management models. While from the outset
SEAT employed a model that, according to Chandler, could be deﬁned as
managerial, FASA operated a personal style of management until it became
FASA-Renault. Likewise, both companies enjoyed government favour. While
SEAT, recognised as an enterprise of national interest, was controlled by the
INI, FASA was chaired by Nicolas Franco, whose primary business skill was
that of pulling the strings of government.
As Table 1 shows, SEAT and FASA took the lead in the development of
the automotive industry in Spain. The main role fell to a public company
whose aggregate output represented nearly 55 per cent of all cars produced
in the period. However, challengers soon appeared. The ﬁrst was Citroën
Hispania, which completed assembly of its ﬁrst units in 1961. Close behind
followed Barreiros Diesel and AUTHI, which began operations in the
mid-1960s. Nevertheless, none of the challengers were able to reach the
production levels of the two ﬁrst-movers.
3. THE FAILURE OF THE CHALLENGERS
Following in Renault’s wake, the Michelin family, owners of Citroën, took
an interest in the possibility of production in Spain. In August 1955, Pedro
TABLE 1
PRODUCTION AND REGISTRATION OF PASSENGER CARS IN SPAIN, 1965-1975
Cumulative production Cumulative registration
Units % Units %
SEAT 2,679,372 54.1 SEAT 2,331,325 52.5
FASA 1,125,495 22.7 Renault 1,040,795 23.3
Citroën Hispania 424,947 8.6 Citroën 319,273 7.1
Barreiros Diesel 498,743 10.1 Simca 392,145 8.8
AUTHI 224,826 4.5 Dodge 24,994 0.6
Others 754 0.0 Morris 135,606 3.0
Remainder 224,881 5.0
Sources: Catalan (2000, p. 150) and Dirección General de Tráﬁco (1960-1985).
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González Bueno, a former minister and colleague of Suanzes in Franco’s ﬁrst
government, requested permission to produce the Citroën 2CV. Permission,
which came in the spring of 1956, required a minimum rate of domestic
content of 60 per cent within 4 years and the annual production quota was
limited to 10,000 vehicles for the Spanish market, with the remaining output
necessarily destined for export (see Lebrancon 2009, p. 302). According to De
la Torre (2007, p. 114), the Council of Ministers authorised the parent
company to take up 45 per cent of the shares in Citroën Hispania, provided
that the investment reached 100 million pesetas (a sum that doubled the
initial investment) and that 80 per cent was applied to ﬁxed assets. Once
again, permission had been obtained by a man with close ties to the regime.
In September 1956, Citroën announced that the future Citroën Hispania,
led by González Bueno, would be located in the Free Zone of the port of Vigo.
The ﬁrst cars rolled out of the plant in 1961, but it was not until 1965 that
annual output exceeded 10,000 units. Despite projections, domestic demand
provided the main — and practically only — market until well into the
1970s. Production ﬁgures for Citroën Hispania hovered on the threshold for
mass production. The ﬁrm did not experience real development until the 1970s.
Until that time, as Carmona and Nadal (2005, p. 332) show, they manufactured
a single low-end model with obsolete machinery at low levels of productivity.
On 21 July 1959, the Spanish government enacted a decree-law on economic
planning that served as the cornerstone of a programme of stabilisation and
gradual liberalisation of the economy in response to the evident inability of the
state to meet its foreign debts. Although public intervention continued under
the legislation, the manifest intention was to move towards a market economy.
In this direction, a decree was passed on 26 January 1963 to authorise the
unrestricted set up, expansion and relocation of industries, although the state
reserved the power to establish standards to be followed in accordance with
the characteristics of each sector, as well as the power to guide and stimulate
the creation of new enterprises and to modernise and restructure existing ones.
Shortly afterwards, the state laid down the conditions by which the automotive
industry was to operate. First, the minimum production capacity was set at
75,000 passenger cars a year and increased 2 years later to 125,000 passenger
cars in two work shifts. Second, for new enterprises and new models, the
percentages of domestic production were set at 90 per cent for the ﬁrst unit
produced from the 3rd year of production (BOE, 22 July 1959, 29 February
1963, 19 March 1963, 18 July 1964 and 12 January 1965).
The ﬁrst initiative to spring up under the new legal framework was the
company Barreiros Diesel Sociedad Anónima (Barreiros). A family ﬁrm
founded in 1954 at the behest of Eduardo Barreiros Rodríguez, the new
enterprise sought to manufacture diesel engines and commercial vehicles in
Villaverde (Madrid), making use of Barreiros’s 1951 patent for converting
gasoline engines to diesel. Within a few years, Barreiros had a capital
stock of 200 million pesetas. His chief source of ﬁnance was the Banco de
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Vizcaya, which took a seat on the board of directors in 1959, as a minority
shareholder9.
In 1962, a ﬁnancial crisis stemming from excessive sales ﬁnancing
left Barreiros in dire straits10. In need of a capital infusion, Eduardo
Barreiros, who had already shown an interest in the manufacture of pas-
senger cars, turned to Chrysler where he found a solution to his liking11. In
December 1963, the U.S. automaker acquired 40 per cent of the company.
Under the stipulations of the purchase, Barreiros would produce the
high-end Dodge Dart and the mid-range Simca 1000. The projected volumes,
however, were overly optimistic: forecast sales for 1966 were 21,000 units of
the Dodge Dart and 62,000 units of the Simca 1000, while the actual results
were 6,000 and 35,000, respectively. Before long, it became clear that
Barreiros’s indebtedness, compounded by new investments, had no prospect
of solution.
In mid-1967, Chrysler estimated that reﬂoating the company would
require an investment in plant and distribution network in the region of 35
million U.S. dollars. Before the year-end, the Americans had taken 77.2 per
cent of the shares and control of Barreiros. In 1969, Chrysler announced an
increase of 2.7 billion pesetas in share capital, requiring full payment on
subscription. As García Ruiz and Santos (2001, pp. 167-189) explain, this
provision forced Barreiros to liquidate his stake in the company that bore
his name. As a result, Barreiros Diesel became Chrysler Spain. The new
company reported no proﬁts until 1972 (see Table 2). By that time, Chrysler’s
stake in the company had reached 98 per cent.
The last company to emerge in the 1960s was Automóviles de Turismo
Hispano Ingleses Sociedad Anónima (AUTHI). The company began to take
shape in late 1964, when it became clear that FASA intended to break
relations with NMQ for the provision of engines. At that time, Eduardo
Ruiz de Huidobro took over the manufacturing licences for the Morris and
Mini passenger cars of the British Motor Corporation. AUTHI began
operations in April 1967 in a plant located near Pamplona. From the
beginning, the company faced sharp constraints on its production capacity,
owing to a paltry initial capital of 20 million pesetas and the refusal of its
British partners to take a stake (see De la Torre 2007, p. 133). The low volume
of their production runs in the ﬁrst 3 years of activity reached only 15,000,
21,000 and 16,000 vehicles a year and this hampered the achievement
of a minimum level of competitiveness, which left the company in an
untenable position.
9 A history of the company can be found in García Ruiz and Santos (2003) and Thomas (2007).
10 Until then, Barreiros had manufactured 45,000 engines and 9,000 trucks (García Ruiz and
Santos 2003, p. 192).
11 In May 1960, Barreiros had requested permission to produce high-end cars, negotiating
with Aston Martin, Jaguar, Rootes and GM. However, the operation was cancelled as a result of
opposition from SEAT and INI.
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In 1969, after examining several options such as Ford and SEAT, the
British took a 50 per cent stake in AUTHI and removed the founder from
management. Shareholder equity quickly expanded by 1.387 billion pesetas,
with NMQ contributing half in the form of assets (the engine plant) plus
229 million pesetas. Despite the rise in production volumes between 1970
and 1973, the newmanagement did not succeed in turning AUTHI into a ﬁrm
that was either competitive or proﬁtable. It was no accident that every
ﬁnancial year closed in the red. Ultimately, the company went bankrupt in
February 1975 and was absorbed by SEAT.
Doing business with the British was perhaps not a good choice. Among
the advanced capitalist economies, the United Kingdom provides the most
obvious example of a declining automotive sector. In 1974, British Leyland
Motor Corporation (heir to Morris, Austin and Leyland), in a state of bank-
ruptcy, had to be bailed out by the government. British producers were
clearly failing to exploit scale economies, with too many low-volume models
and low-volume plants with excess capacity constraining productivity
and undermining proﬁtability. As Foreman-Peck et al. (1995) showed, these
factors combined with poor business strategies, under-investment stemming
TABLE 2
NET PROFITS BY MAKER, 1965-1973 (MILLION PESETAS OF 1965)
SEAT FASA-Renault Barreiros1 AUTHI
1965 570 146 121
1966 543 191 254
1967 510 245 −582
1968 436 231 − 225
1969 566 257 − 406
1970 586 280 − 620
1971 460 259 − 481
1972 643 299 25
1973 793 284 331 − 477
Total 5,107 2,191 −1,585 − 2,1372
Notes:
1Chrysler España since 1971.
2Losses accumulated in 1973 and 1974.
Sources: SEAT (1962-1986), FASA-Renault (1951-1986), García Ruiz and Santos (2001, p. 344) for
Barreiros; and ABC newspaper for AUTHI. The series are expressed with the deﬂator offered in Prados De
La Escosura (2003, p. 567).
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from the lack of proﬁts, poor industrial relations characterised by constant
disputes and unsound public policies12.
While Barreiros and AUTHI obtained governmental approval, the case
of Industrias del Motor Sociedad Anónima (IMOSA), which was based in
Vitoria-Gasteiz, followed a different course. On 6 October 1965, IMOSA
requested permission to manufacture the famous Volkswagen Beetle. In
competing with AUTHI, this decision appeared to be a good course of action.
The Beetle became the best selling model of all time, surpassing the model T
in 197313. With their strategy of only one model, the Germans provided an
excellent example of the exploitation of scale economies14. On 7 December,
IMOSA requested provisional enrolment in the industrial registry, announ-
cing an annual production of 125,000 units. Two days after publishing the
request in the BOE, the ministry enacted a decree that raised the minimum
level for production of passenger cars for new industries to 250,000 units a
year (BOE, 20 and 22 December 1965). Although IMOSA announced its
willingness to reach this target by 1970, in a transparent act of cynicism the
ministry dismissed IMOSA’s request on the grounds that industries of limited
size brought serious problems of competitiveness. To avoid fresh upheavals,
the government took action a year later to add the manufacture of passenger
cars to the group of industries in need of administrative permission for their
establishment of facilities, their expansion or their relocation (BOE, 25 July
1967). In spite of the fact that IMOSA presented a detailed report, a budget,
an economic study, an implementation plan and a document attesting to the
provision of land, it was quite unable to win over the ministry.
These dynamics demonstrate how policies applied to passenger cars in
the 1950s and 1960s sought to lay down conditions that would encourage
the development of established ﬁrms, particularly SEAT. The result was
essentially positive. The main causes of the sector’s boom need to be located
in the fact that the market was empty and practically closed to imports,
facilitating the placement of domestic production15. In addition, the tight
control of production licences enabled SEAT and FASA to take better
advantage of potential economies of scale.
As Figure 1 shows, the «challenger» ﬁrms were unable to achieve their
aim of wresting a sufﬁciently signiﬁcant market share in order to permit
competitive unit costs in relation to the ﬁrst-movers. All the challengers
presented the same characteristics, setting out with little locally controlled
capital and employing a personal style of management. Neither Citroën
12 While Lazonick (1990) emphasises poor industrial relations, Dunnet (1980) and Adeney
(1988) stress unsound public policies.
13 An exhaustive history of the Volkswagen Beetle can be found in Rieger (2013).
14 The strategy of Volkswagen is analysed in Tolliday (1995).
15 In 1960, Spain had one passenger car for every 105 inhabitants, while France, Great
Britain and West Germany had one for every ten inhabitants. As Viñas et al. showed, in 1979, the
subsector «motor vehicles» was the most heavily protected, with an effective level of 164 per cent.
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Hispania nor AUTHI was able to count on the help of local partners
with sufﬁciently strong knowhow or technological partners who would
genuinely commit to their development. In the case of Barreiros, despite
the undeniable entrepreneurial spirit of its founder and a proven track
record in the motoring world, it is clear that the company could not ﬁnd a
ﬁnancial partner with adequate resources and it made a poor choice of
technological partner.
The availability of a sufﬁciently robust ﬁnancial partner proved crucial
for challenger ﬁrms because, according to Chandler, they, unlike the ﬁrst-
movers, did not enjoy the same ability to reinvest extraordinarily high proﬁts.
As Table 2 shows, the latecomers were permanently in debt. Clearly, their
failure to produce proﬁts limited their investments in production and
commercialisation alike, hindering them in their attempts to compete with
SEAT and FASA-Renault. Thus, as Chandler explains, the lack of a more
solid ﬁnancial partner can also be explained by the greater risks associated
with the investment. All the latecomers ended up following the same path,
being absorbed by the licensing house and adopting a managerial structure.
However, as Chandler points out, this was not enough in order to be able
to challenge the ﬁrst-movers. When the challengers emerged, SEAT and
FASA-Renault had already progressed far enough along the learning curve of
FIGURE 1
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0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
SEAT Renault Citroën Simca Morris
Source: Dirección General de Tráﬁco 1960-1985.
INSIDE THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM
Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 301
their industry’s functional activities that they could block their challengers’
growth before they had the ability to develop the necessary competitive skills.
Structural change in an industry like automaking, which has economies of
scale that provide highly signiﬁcant cost advantages, involves modifying the
rules of the game.
4. A NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY
In late 1972, the industrial policy applied to automaking made a 180°
about-face. The trigger was a preferential agreement signed between Spain
and the EEC 2 years earlier. This agreement resulted in lower EEC tariffs on
Spanish cars, which fell to a mere 3.3 per cent in 1974. After the agreement,
Ford and GM relaunched the projects that they had abandoned with the
victory of Franco’s rebels: using Spain as a production platform for mid-to-
low-end models aimed at the European market.
The interest displayed by the U.S. giants led to a shift in the strategic
policies of the Spanish government. The chief embodiment of this shift took
shape in the passage of the so-called Ford decrees of late 1972. In Decree
3339/1972 of 30 November, regulating the manufacture of passenger cars,
the rationale for the turnabout was put as the need to raise the competi-
tiveness of existing manufacturers in order to increase their exports and
stimulate their specialisation within the international strategy of large-scale
enterprises16. However, their primary purpose was to enable Ford to set up in
Spain. The conditions established for the entry of new competitors, which
perfectly suited the wishes of the Americans, set the minimum local content
level at 50 per cent, put the minimum threshold for investment in ﬁxed assets
at 10 billion pesetas, established the export percentage at two-thirds of unit
production, pegged the value of imported pieces, parts and other compo-
nents at no greater than 50 per cent of the value of the exported cars, and
limited sales in the domestic market to 10 per cent of total sales in the
previous year (BOE, 7 December 1972). In fact, during these years, labour
costs in Spain’s car industry remained lower than those in their main West
European counterparts. However, the purchase costs of raw materials, parts
and components (representing about two-thirds of total costs) were higher17.
Thus, the reduction in the local content share substantially increased Ford’s
competitiveness.
The second Ford decree, enacted on 23 December, declared the sector of
preferential interest with the aim of stimulating the investments needed for
16 Although previous local content levels were maintained, the decree authorised a minimum
of 50 per cent when the value of imported pieces, parts and components did not exceed 50 per cent
of the value of automobiles exported.
17 The ﬁnal cost per unit was 25 per cent lower than the average EEC cost (FASA-Renault
1976).
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the private initiative to expand exports and ramp up plant capacity and
production by model. The declaration included incentives for land expro-
priation in order to establish or expand plants, tax reductions of up to 95 per
cent, and freedom to depreciate new plant and equipment during the ﬁrst
5 years. For any company to take advantage of these beneﬁts, it needed to
fulﬁl the following conditions within 4 years: an average production rate of
greater than 500 vehicles per day; mass production greater than 400 units
per day for a basic model or greater than 200 for two models; gross invest-
ment in ﬁxed assets greater than 7 billion pesetas, and minimum annual
exports at 20 per cent of production (BOE, 29 January 1973).
This policy was reafﬁrmed in April 1979 with the enactment of Royal
Decree 816/1979 governing the organisation of the sector. Behind the new
law was the view that the industry established in Spain could not remain
aloof from the growing international integration that was taking place or
ignore the substantial investments being made in industrial restructuring
and in the expansion of production capacity that went hand in hand with
restructuring. This forced a new ﬂexibility in the regime’s approaches to
production, leading to a relaxation in access to the domestic market and a
gradual reduction in the levels of local content so that, in the medium term,
the industrial schemes would converge between manufacturers established
before and after 1972.
Along these lines, manufacturers in existence before 1972 were permitted
to lower their level of local content gradually to a minimum of 60 per cent in
1984. In addition, the export values of ﬁnished vehicles and of the compo-
nents of the manufacturer and its subsidiaries were required to exceed by
20 per cent the import values of vehicles and components. For automakers
arriving after 1972, their overall local content level was set at 55 per cent,
their export values of ﬁnished vehicles and components needed to exceed the
value of their imports by 50 per cent, and their minimum exports of ﬁnished
vehicles was set at two-thirds of annual unit production. Lastly, this latter
group was required to meet a minimum capacity of 600 units per day and
their maximum sales were ﬁxed at 10 per cent of the total number of units
registered in the previous year, until 1 January 1983, when this constraint
would elapse. These conditions suited GM’s wishes perfectly, to the point
that Opel manufactured its ﬁrst cars in 1983.
In 1974, shortly after sanctioning the shift in the strategy governing
industrial policy, the Spanish economy received the ﬁrst shocks of a deep
recession from which it would not emerge until 1985. Spain’s difﬁculties
were the result of the crisis spreading through the economies of the West.
While the ﬁrst signs of deterioration had appeared in the late 1960s, reces-
sion hit in 1974 and did not relent until 1983 in most industrialised nations.
However, its impact in Spain was deeper and more long-lasting. According to
Rojo (1994), the reasons for this lay in a weaker energy base, a weaker
industrial structure and the greater weight of the affected sectors, and these
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factors were compounded by the amassed rigidities of 30 years of dictatorship
and the beginning of political reforms that demanded less strict adjustment
policies.
Since the application of the national Stabilisation Plan, the Spanish
economy had experienced extremely high annual growth rates (8 per cent on
average), which plummeted from 1974 onwards. Until 1978, however, public
spending continued to grow between 4 and 5 per cent a year. The contraction
in growth was sharply compounded by inﬂation, which began to skyrocket in
1974 and reached a maximum of 24.7 per cent in 1977. Measures were
applied to combat the threat and the climb was slowed, but the rate of
inﬂation did not drop below 15 per cent until 1981 and it was not until 1986
that the rate fell below 10 per cent. In turn, the adjustment policies caused a
sharp contraction of economic growth, with annual growth rates sinking
below 1.5 per cent until the year that Spain joined the European Community,
and actually falling into the red in 1981. An immediate consequence was a
slump in investment, which translated into a sharp decline in employment
and the appearance of high unemployment rates that topped 10 per cent,
starting in 198018.
The fall in wages caused internal demand to drop; this had a particularly
strong effect on durable consumer goods, such as cars. The registration of
passenger cars contracted dramatically from 1977 and hit bottom in 1981,
falling to a level similar to 1972. However, despite the harsh impact of the
crisis, the production of passenger cars in 1986 was double the level of 1972.
The combination of production and registration ﬁgures in Spain, shown in
Figure 2, is a very clear illustration of how the sector’s growth necessarily
had to be sustained through high levels of exports.
5. INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING
With Ford’s return to Spain, the U.S. giant gained access to the only large
European market where it had no presence. In addition, Ford achieved its
objective of using the peninsula as an export platform for mid-to-low-end
passenger cars aimed at Europe. Not only did Ford obtain legislation per-
fectly suited to its interest, but it also beneﬁted from numerous incentives
from the public administrations in the form of prices for land and other types
of ﬁnancial assistance. According to Pérez Sanchó (2003, pp. 131-143), Ford
set up where it wanted, imposing its conditions and relying on public agents
simply to obtain the resources needed and in the best possible conditions. In
addition, as Catalan (2011a, p. 108) explains, the CEO of Ford España was
Claudio Boada, INI’s president in the early 1970s. Ford built its industrial
complex in Valencia. The production of HCS engines began in 1975 and cars
18 Between 1977 and 1985, the employed population fell from 12.8 to 10.6 million people,
increasing the unemployment rate to 21.9 per cent (Carreras and Tafunell 2004, p. 367).
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came on line a year later. The Fiesta was the only model until 1981, when
production was diversiﬁed with the Escort. The sales of the Fiesta in Spain
reached a high of 76,000 units in 1979, with 11 per cent market share, and
then steadily declined to 26,000 in 1986, with 4 per cent market share.
However, the Fiesta was chieﬂy for export: West Germany, France and Great
Britain absorbed practically all of its sales abroad, which reached a high of
209,000 units in 1980.
After several unsuccessful attempts, new negotiations began in 1977 and
led to the passage of Decree 816/1979, tailor-made to suit GM. GM built a plant
in Figueruelas (Zaragoza) and formed the company GM Spain, whose shares
were owned by the GM parent company (73.5 per cent) and by Opel, GM’s
German subsidiary. The company’s interest in the peninsula needs to be seen
as comparable with the interest of Ford: to widen the range of models by
adding a car at the mid-to-low end. For 20 years, GM Spain’s factory specia-
lised in manufacturing the Opel Corsa, which ﬁrst came off the production line
in August 1982 and had a production capacity of 1,200 units per day with two
work shifts. In 1983, annual production of the Corsa hit 245,000 units and rose
to 275,000 units in 1985. The focus of this activity was clearly for export and its
chief markets were West Germany, Great Britain and France19.
FIGURE 2
PASSENGER CARS PRODUCED AND REGISTERED IN SPAIN (UNITS)
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Source: ANFAC (1977-2002).
19 The history of Opel Spain can be found in German (2003).
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SEAT’s share of the industry’s overall production declined continuously
during the period, falling from 50 per cent in 1973 to 18 per cent in 1985. In
April 1973, shortly after Ford received the green light to enter Spain, the
Spanish government contacted GM for the company to absorb AUTHI,
which was going through a dramatic crisis with its results. To fend off the
establishment of another U.S. automaker, SEAT expressed a willingness
to take on the acquisition. AUTHI had three activities: the production of
vehicles in Navarre, engine manufacture in Cantabria and the fabrication of
seats in Santpedor (Barcelona). In 1969, FIAT had already stated its ﬁrm
opposition to purchasing AUTHI. Now it agreed to acquire the assembly
plant, but maintained its refusal to purchase the engine factory (see Catalan
2007, pp. 153-162).
In March 1975, SEAT, backed by public ﬁnancial assistance, acquired the
assembly plant for 1.1 billion pesetas. In a context of unmistakable recession
and clear over-capacity, these purchases pushed SEAT to close the 1976
ﬁnancial year in the red for the ﬁrst time and the company would not turn a
proﬁt again until 1988. The situation of uncontrolled losses led the INI to
propose the full takeover of the company to FIAT. In June 1979, the ﬁrst
agreement was signed by which the Italians made a commitment to push
through a restructuring plan. In the middle of negotiations, however, the
Spanish government cleared the way for Opel’s entry. As Catalan showed
(2007, pp. 165-167), the inconsistency of the government, compounded by
the magnitude of the losses, caused the Italians to relinquish their presence
in Spain. In May 1981, FIAT transferred all of its shares in SEAT to the INI.
A year later, the public holding company signed an initial agreement with
Volkswagen that stipulated that SEAT would manufacture roughly 120,000
units of German vehicles a year. In addition, the agreement established that
50,000 units of the Volkswagen Polo would be exported each year in exchange
for Volkswagen’s use of SEAT sales network in Spain. The state’s assumption of
a large amount of the losses (198 billion pesetas amassed between 1978 and
1985) led to gradual increases in share capital overseen by the INI (80 billion
pesetas in total), which were added to substantial levels of direct subsidies from
the INI (110 billion pesetas) and the state’s assumption of debt amounting to
185 billion pesetas (see Martín Aceña and Comín 1991, pp. 165-167; Catalan
2011b, pp 260–266). SEAT began to recover with the launch of the Ibiza model
in 1984. Once SEAT had returned to health, the Spanish government of
socialist Felipe González privatised the company, which embarked on a new
period in its history as the third make of the Volkswagen Group.
In the case of FASA-Renault, the company entered the period in serious
turmoil, but its evolution was much more successful than that of the publicly
owned SEAT. The Renault subsidiary experienced losses for the ﬁrst time
in 1974 and went on to record losses for 2 more years as a consequence
of serious industrial disputes. An initial consequence was the suspension of
its development programme, which aimed primarily at increasing the
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company’s production capacity through the construction of a third assembly
plant. As a result, the production level stagnated in a period when the
demand for Renault models was clearly undergoing a boom. By mid-1976,
the company achieved stability and this enabled it to salvage its expansion
plans. With its third plant in Palencia entering into operation, FASA-Renault
soon became the leading ﬁrm in the sector. The increase in production,
which rose from little more than 200,000 cars in 1976 to nearly 350,000 in
1980, took place in the worst years of the economic crisis. This development
was possible because of the excellent performance of domestic sales and
export sales, which stood at roughly 100,000 units in 1980. The primary and
practically the only client was Renault itself, which took on the job of redis-
tributing the Spanish cars across Europe from its ofﬁces in France. Figure 3
illustrates how slight increases in domestic sales in a market in contraction
enabled Renault to account for approximately a third of all registrations in
1980, turning it into the leading make in Spain. These results can largely be
put down to the market’s excellent response to the Renault 5, a model in the
mid-to-low range that perfectly suited the circumstances at the time.
In this second phase, SEAT and FASA-Renault could do little more
than maintain their market share and proﬁts, adapting their managerial
capabilities to changes in their environment. Their respective trajectories are
FIGURE 3
REGISTRATION OF PASSENGER CARS IN SPAIN BY MAKE (%)
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
SEAT Renault Citroën Ford
Source: Dirección General de Tráﬁco 1960-1985.
INSIDE THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM
Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 307
indicative of a somewhat uneven performance. While SEAT accumulated
huge losses, and lost market share year-on-year; FASA-Renault made mas-
sive proﬁts, consolidating its position as a leader in Spain. As Table 3 shows,
of those enterprises established before 1972, only FASA-Renault was capable
of maintaining its proﬁts, suggesting that SEAT failed to develop its
managerial capabilities. By contrast, FASA-Renault was able to develop its
functional capacities and to adapt its strategies to an evolving industry,
which, in line with Chandler, accounts for its success in the long term. Ford
and Opel, meanwhile, both sought to compete in European markets, where
they rapidly increased their net proﬁts, maintaining positive outcomes until
at least the end of the century20. Since the mid-1970s, the growth of the car
TABLE 3
NET PROFITS BY MAKER, 1974-1986 (MILLION PESETAS OF 1974)
SEAT
FASA-
Renault
Citroën
Hispania
Chrysler
España1 Ford
1974 373 −127 154 683
1975 54 −288 151 437
1976 − 342 −519 191 145 −608
1977 248 950 960 434 46
1978 − 5,264 488 104 495 467
1979 − 6,665 1,128 284 −38 117
1980 − 7,913 1,465 −17 − 1,880 173
1981 − 7,024 1,225 − 266 − 3,313 2,262
1982 − 7,247 4,249 − 532 − 3,962 2,551
1983 − 9,894 3,084 −1,222 − 2,288 940
1984 − 9,037 103 −1,344 − 1,318 3,019
1985 − 8,456 16 −25 − 114 2,264
1986 − 5,831 3,992 646 431 4,181
Total −66,998 15,766 − 915 −10,288 15,413
Note:
1Automoviles Talbot since 1980.
Sources: SEAT (1962-1986), FASA-Renault (1951-1986), Citroën Hispania (1973, 1983), ABC news-
paper for Chrysler/Talbot; and Oltra (2008) for Ford. The series are expressed with the deﬂator offered in
Prados De La Escosura (2003, p. 567).
20 Ford had losses in 1993 and 1998.
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industry formed part of the general strategy of the large ﬁrms to use Spain as
an export platform to Europe, with the scale economies remaining at the
core of this process.
The last large business group with a presence in Spain is PSA Peugeot
Citroën. In 1973, Citroën took control of its Spanish subsidiary. One year
later, the Michelin family offered to sell its automotive subsidiary to Peugeot.
The new group, with Peugeot as the majority shareholder, was formed on
30 September 1976. For Peugeot, one of the most positive aspects of the
operation was the consolidation of its position in Europe, particularly the
ability to enter Spain. Despite the fact that the changes occurring in 1973,
namely the divestment of shares by the group afﬁliated to González Bueno,
had strengthened the position of Citroën Hispania, the impetus given by the
French was quite weak in comparative terms.
Achieving economies of scale was one of the central pillars of the PSA
strategy. According to Loubet (1998, pp. 345-347), the French sought to increase
the volume of runs by integrating the various plants in a new division of labour.
From 1977, the plant in Vigo began the joint production of Citroën models (GS
and CX) and Peugeot models (504 and 505), embarking on a process of diver-
sifying its supply21. However, the incorporation of the Spanish plant in these
synergies made slow progress and it did not achieve full consolidation until the
second half of the 1990s. In addition, the production levels that were attained
did not compare with those of the remaining manufacturers in the sector.
In August 1978, PSA’s acquisition of Chrysler Europe resulted in the
creation of its third automotive subsidiary, Talbot, which grew out of the
merger of Simca (Chrysler France), Rootes (Chrysler UK) and Chrysler
Spain. In that year, the production of the former Barreiros reached 99,000
units. However, 12 months later, its output had contracted by 33 per cent,
beginning a period of continuous decline that lasted 5 years. This decline ran
in parallel with the decline experienced by Talbot at the European level22.
The situation did not begin to right itself until 1983, when PSA took the
decision to modernise its Spanish facilities by opening a manufacturing line
for Peugeot XUD diesel engines and another for BE1 gearboxes. The ﬁnal
impetus came a year later with the start of production of the Peugeot 205,
which pushed output over 100,000 units in 1986. Once again, another ﬁrm in
the sector found its salvation in the production of mid-to-low-end passenger
cars. Thus, both Citroën Hispania and Talbot had to wait until 1986 to see
their bottom line back in the black (see Table 3).
Since the mid-1970s, international groups have used the Iberian Peninsula
as a platform to export to Europe. Spain’s competitiveness was based on its
21 In 1983, PSA had a 68 per cent stake in Citroën Hispania, 51 per cent in the hands of
Citroën SA and 17 per cent in the hands of Automobiles Peugeot SA (Citroën Hispania 1983).
22 In 1984, PSA decided to remove Talbot as its third brand. The reasons were the incon-
sistencies with Peugeot and the collapse of its sales in France (Loubet 1998).
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labour costs and strengthened by a supply of cheap industrial land23, which
accounts for the greenﬁeld locations of Ford and GM in Valencia and
Zaragoza24. The main EEC markets absorbed Spain’s large volume of exports
and now the country’s gradual integration into Europe was essential in
sustaining the growth of the car industry, with its scale economies acting as the
driving force.
6. CONCLUSIONS
As Chandler argues, economies of scale allowed the ﬁrst-movers to
establish a high barrier of entry that thwarted the development of their
challengers. Two companies, founded in the middle of the century, enjoyed
brilliant trajectories in the 1950s and 1960s: the rise of SEAT was based on
the exploitation of scale economies derived from the success of the SEAT
600, a mid-to-low range model; while the takeoff of FASA-Renault in the
early 1960s took place as a result of the French acquisition of the former
FASA. Renault successfully boosted its new Spanish subsidiary through a
three-pronged investment plan: expanding and modernising its production
facilities; completely reforming its marketing and distribution network in
line with its commercial capabilities in its ongoing competitive struggle
in France; and modifying its directive hierarchy with its managerial and
organisational capabilities being promoted on the other side of the Pyrenees.
Thus, SEAT and FASA-Renault both successfully leveraged their competitive
advantage as ﬁrst-movers.
By contrast, the ﬁrms that challenged their position did not succeed in
their push to grab a sufﬁciently large market share to achieve competitive
unit costs. Neither Citroën Hispania nor AUTHI enjoyed the assistance of
local stakeholders with sufﬁcient knowhow or a technology partner to make
a genuine commitment to its development. In the case of Barreiros, despite
the undoubted business spirit of its founder and a proven track record in
the motoring world, the company plainly lacked a ﬁnancial partner with
adequate resources and it made a poor choice of technological partner.
The evidence provided shows that latecomers were unable to obtain either
sufﬁcient market share or sufﬁcient net proﬁts to challenge the positions
of SEAT and FASA-Renault. This lack of proﬁtability undermined their
capacity for self-investment, demonstrating their shortfall in ﬁnancial and
technological knowhow.
23 One of the main incentives for Ford and GM in the legislation was that of land prices.
24 However, industrial relations do not appear to have been any more stable than they were
in countries such as the United Kingdom or Italy. In the face of a declining dictatorship, the
country’s car plants were one of the bastions of opposition to the Franco regime. All Spanish
factories were typiﬁed by major industrial disputes, which combined labour and political friction.
See Tappi (2008) for SEAT; Charron (1998) for FASA-Renault; and Iriarte (1995) for AUTHI.
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The evidence presented appears to conﬁrm the conclusions drawn by
Binda (2012) that Spain’s large manufacturing ﬁrms shaped their strategies
and structures based not solely on economic facts, but also in relation to the
political and social context, pointing to the importance of such factors
as delayed industrialisation and state intervention. The dynamics of the
Spanish auto industry conﬁrm that policies to promote industrialisation
played a key role in the takeoff of the mass production of passenger cars.
Until the mid-1970s, the implemented policies remained very constant:
reserving the market for domestic production, maintaining strict control
over the number of manufacturers and requiring a high degree of domestic
content. The closure of the market led to practically all of the domestic
supply ﬁnding buyers. The limitation on the number of manufacturers
favoured the utilisation of economies of scale. The high local content
requirements increased ﬁrm size. During these years, domestic demand was
the driving force behind sector growth, while the availability of a relatively
abundant cheap labour supply was not a signiﬁcant factor in the decision-
making process of multinational ﬁrms that opted to transfer their technol-
ogy. The companies transferring technology always did so with the intention
of taking advantage of the growth phase of an average-sized market that had
low levels of motorisation and was protected by high external tariffs.
The enactment of the Ford decrees marked a break with the policies
applied in the previous 2 decades. No longer viewing the domestic market as
the driving force or requiring the production of components internally, the
policy shifted towards a commitment to foreign markets as the primary
agents of future development and towards lower requirements on domestic
production. The enactment of the 1979 decree reafﬁrmed this policy and
paved the way for the liberalisation of imports of components and ﬁnished
vehicles. Both Ford and Opel directed the bulk of their production towards
the EEC, creating a new structure in the sector. Since the mid-1970s,
the trajectory of SEAT suggests that it failed to develop its managerial
capabilities, losing market share and proﬁts in the process. By contrast,
FASA-Renault was able to develop its functional capacities and to adapt its
strategies to an evolving industry, which accounts for its success in the long
term, in keeping with Chandler’s point of view. In this period, the growth of
the car industry formed part of the general strategy of the large ﬁrms to use
Spain as an export platform to Europe, with the scale economies remaining
at the core of this process. The restructuring of the sector shaped the
new role that Spain was to play in the automotive industry as a producer
specialising in mid-to-low-end models aimed at Europe.
The evidence presented also shows how the ability to control and pull the
strings of government constituted one of the industry’s core competencies
throughout the period. While SEAT was a public company, the presidents of
FASA and Citroën Hispania were, respectively, General Franco’s brother and a
former minister in his ﬁrst cabinet. In the 1970s, the negotiations conducted
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by Henry Ford II with the Ministry of Industry culminated in the enactment of
the decrees of 1972, which granted the Americans their main requests. Not
only were these decrees referred to as the «Ford decrees», but the president of
Ford España was Claudio Boada, INI’s president in 1972. Similarly, GM also
secured legislation that was completely adapted to the company’s interests.
The ﬁrms established before the legislative changes of 1972 were founded
predominantly with Spanish capital and operated a personal style of
management, with the exception of SEAT, which operated a managerial
model from the outset. By contrast, in 1985 all the ﬁrms were under the
control of large international groups and operated a managerial model. Thus,
although it was not until the 1980s that the structure of the automotive
industry in Spain could be fully deﬁned within the model of competitive
managerial capitalism described by Chandler, its dynamics indicate that
from the mid-1960s on this was the direction in which it was evolving.
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